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Adaptive mechanism design and game
theoretic analysis of auction-driven dynamic
spectrum access in cognitive radio networks
Wei Zhong1*, Youyun Xu1, Jiaheng Wang2, Dapeng Li3 and Huaglory Tianfield4
Abstract
This paper studies the auction-driven dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks with heterogeneous
secondary users, who have different risk attitudes. First, a game theoretic framework is established for auction-driven
dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. The utility functions and bidding strategies of heterogeneous
secondary users are defined, and the parameterized auction mechanisms of primary user are also introduced. Then,
we formulate the auction-driven dynamic spectrum access problem as a finite discrete game with a mixed- or
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solution. We study the existence and uniqueness properties of the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the defined game. Next, we propose a distributed learning automata algorithm (DLA) to attain the Nash
equilibrium of the defined game with limited feedback. The adaptive mechanism design is realized in the updating
procedure of our DLA algorithm. We further prove that our DLA algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium of the
defined game. Finally, simulation results show that our DLA algorithm is efficient and outperforms the dynamic
spectrum access schemes with fixed auction mechanism.
1 Introduction
Cognitive radio aims to improve the utilization of radio
electromagnetic spectrum, which is scarce but often
underutilized [1]. To realize efficient spectrum utiliza-
tion, various spectrummanagement techniques have been
proposed for cognitive radio networks, and the auction-
based spectrum management has recently attracted wide
attention [2,3].
Existing work mainly focused on using game theory
to analyze the behaviors of the secondary users under a
certain auction mechanism. Furthermore, the secondary
users are usually assumed to be symmetric and homo-
geneous. Symmetry and homogeneity of secondary users
are, however, generally not realistic in practical cognitive
radio networks. In practice, secondary users usually have
different risk attitudes in the auction, e.g., some secondary
users are with high channel gain or urgent message and
thus may tend to be risk-seeking, some secondary users are
with non-urgent messages or low channel gain and thus
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may tend to be risk-averse, and the others may be regarded
as risk-neutral buyers between risk-seeking and risk-averse
buyers [4,5].
Byde, 2003 [4] andMaskin and Riley, 1984 [6] have stud-
ied the auction with asymmetric bidders and have shown
that different auction mechanisms would result in differ-
ent outcomes. In other words, a fixed auction mechanism
may not be optimal for the auctioneer in all circumstances
[7,8]. In order to obtain higher revenue, auction mech-
anism should be adaptively designed by the auctioneer
according to the types of the secondary users. There-
fore, for the cognitive radio networks with heterogeneous
(multi-type) secondary users, it is of profound importance
to study the auction-driven dynamic spectrum access with
adaptive auction mechanism design.
Mechanism design [7] is applied to dynamic spectrum
access in cognitive radio networks [9]. A generic parame-
terized auction mechanism design is presented in [9], but
only two specific mechanisms are considered to suppress
cheating and collusive behavior of selfish users, which
contains a class of mechanisms for heterogeneous buyers.
In the adaptive auction mechanism designs in [4,10,11],
the risk attitudes of the buyers are not taken into account.
© 2014 Zhong et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Whereas in [4] evolutionary game theory is applied to
study the auction mechanism design, in our proposed
scheme, distributed learning automata are applied to auc-
tion mechanism design in cognitive radio networks and
the dynamic spectrum access is realized jointly for sec-
ondary users. It is shown in [12] that replicator dynam-
ics based on evolutionary game theory and the learning
automata [13] are quite similar and are actually equiva-
lent in some circumstances. However, learning automata
are computationally simple and efficient and thus are
more appropriate in designing practical distributed algo-
rithm with limited information. Teng et al., 2011 [14]
presents a dynamic spectrum sharing through a double
auction mechanism, and [15] designs a truthful online
spectrum auction for efficient spectrum allocation. How-
ever, neither auctionmodel has considered heterogeneous
secondary users.
Shen et al., 2011 [16] studies dynamic spectrum auction
in wireless networks based on coexistent matrix, and [17]
studies network pricing of private wireless access points
(AP) through a location-dependent multi-AP reverse auc-
tion. Wang et al., 2012 [18] designs an efficient scheme of
spectrum auction game for near-optimal spectrum alloca-
tion. In [19], an auction-based game theoretic approach is
used for relay power allocation in wireless networks. How-
ever, in all these auction models, neither heterogeneous
buyers with different risk attitudes nor adaptive auction
mechanism design has been considered.
In this paper, we study cognitive radio networks with
multiple secondary users that have different risk attitudes
(i.e., heterogeneous buyers). The secondary users compete
to access an idle channel under an auction simultane-
ously. Moreover, the primary user, i.e., the auctioneer, is
able to apply multiple sealed-bid auction mechanisms that
are adaptively designed. In practice, users would not have
exactly full information of the network. Therefore, the aim
of this paper is to address the following questions: how
the auctioneer should design the auctionmechanism adap-
tively to maximize the utility and how the secondary users
should choose their best bidding strategies with limited or
local information.
For this purpose, we formulate the auction-driven spec-
trum access problem as a discrete game and define appro-
priate utility functions for both the secondary users and
the primary user.We then study the existence and unique-
ness properties of the Nash equilibrium solution of the
defined game. Given that the primary user and the sec-
ondary users would not have full information on cogni-
tive radio networks, centralized algorithm is impractical.
Therefore, we propose a practical distributed learning
automata algorithm to attain the Nash equilibrium with
only limited feedback information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the system model of cognitive radio network
is presented. In Section 3, a game theoretic framework is
established for auction-driven dynamic spectrum access
in cognitive radio networks. Specifically, bidding strate-
gies and utility functions are defined for the secondary
users, and a generic parameterized auction mechanism
and the utility function are defined for the primary user.
Then, the auction-driven dynamic spectrum access in
cognitive radio networks is formulated as a finite dis-
crete game. In Section 4, a distributed learning automata
(DLA) algorithm is proposed for evolving the defined
mixed-strategy game to attain the Nash equilibrium solu-
tion to the auction-driven dynamic spectrum access. The
adaptive mechanism design is realized in the updating
procedure of our DLA algorithm, and the convergence
of our DLA algorithm is proved. In Section 5, simu-
lation results are presented for auction-driven dynamic
spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. Finally, con-
clusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Systemmodel of cognitive radio networks
The system model of the cognitive radio network, as
depicted in Figure 1, consists of one primary user and
multiple secondary users coexisting with the primary user.
At a specific instant, we assume that there are n different
secondary users simultaneously sensing the idle spectrum
(i.e., channel) of the primary user. From the resource
market point of view, the channel are the goods to be auc-
tioned, the primary user is the seller or auctioneer, and the
secondary users are the buyers or bidders who are com-
peting to win the goods. For the sake of fairness and max-
imum revenue, the primary user shall adaptively design
an auction mechanism, under which the secondary users
compete for the channel. We assume that the secondary
users choose their own bidding strategies after evaluating
the channel conditions and other necessary information
fed back from the primary user. The primary user hasmul-
tiple, sayM, auction mechanisms to apply. The secondary
users employ the same set of bidding strategies.
We assume that in each fixed duration, the primary user
would organize the auction for the secondary users to
compete under and announces the available channels at
the beginning of every auction. Suppose that each channel
allows only one secondary user to access at an instance.
Whenever a secondary user wins the bid, a certain por-
tion, proportional to its bid, would be registered. After the
data transmission time, the secondary user who has suc-
cessfully accessed the channel shall pay the price at the
end of the frame.
The channel gain between secondary user i and the pri-
mary user is hi. ∀i ∈ N , hi is assumed to be invariant over
duration T, where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the index set of
the secondary users. We should point it out that different
channel models will not affect the theoretic analysis and
results of this paper.
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Figure 1 The systemmodel of auction-driven dynamic spectrum access in a cognitive radio network.
For convenience of reference, Table 1 lists the notations
used in this paper.
3 Strategy game formulation of auction-driven
dynamic spectrum access
3.1 Bidding strategies and utility functions of secondary
users
Let bi denote the bidding strategy of secondary user i and
bi ∈ Bi. Bi = {bi1, · · · , bik , · · · , biKi} is an ordered dis-
crete finite set of bidding strategies of secondary user i,
where Ki is the cardinality of Bi, Ki ≥ 2, bik is the kth
bidding strategy in Bi, and bi1 < · · · < biKi . For each sec-
ondary user i, bi1 represents the null bid and without loss
of generality, is simply normalized to be zero; bi2 denotes
the lowest non-zero admissible bid, i.e., the reserve price,
and it is assumed that bi2 ≥ 1. For the sake of simplicity,
assume that ∀i, j ∈ N , bi2 = bj2. Moreover, the auction
should be replayed if all secondary users choose the null
bid.
Assume that the secondary users are only interested in
their own awards and payments. In general, all secondary
users attempt to win the channel with a low cost. The util-
ity reward to secondary user iwho wins the channel at bid
bi is a discrete function, denoted as ui (vi(Ci, bi)), where vi
is defined as an increasing function of the channel capac-
ity (Ci) of secondary user i, but a decreasing function of
bi. ui (vi) reflects the value of the goods (i.e., channel) to
secondary user i. Ci is defined as
Ci = W log2
⎛




where ρi is the transmit power of secondary user i, W
is the bandwidth of the channel, σ 2 is the mean channel
noise power, and SNR denotes signal-to-noise ratio.
In practice, different secondary users usually have dif-
ferent requirements on services. Some secondary users
may have urgent messages, and some may not have. Con-
sequently, secondary users may fall into heterogeneous
rather than the same type. Since secondary users woould
not have full information of the system, they may exhibit
different risk attitudes when they face uncertain utilities.
For example, secondary users with real-time services, or
high SNR, or urgent messages, may be aggressive about
the risks and try their best to access the channel, so they
are risk-seeking bidders [4]. However, secondary users
with non-real-time services, or low SNR, or non-urgent
messages, may not be so aggressive and thus are risk-
averse and in other cases, secondary users are risk-neural
bidders [4]. The characterization of the heterogeneous
secondary users and the risk attitude is described in
Table 2.
To mathematically characterize the aforementioned
three types of risk attitudes, i.e., risk-seeking, risk-averse,
risk-neural, we adopt the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function (i.e., expected utility function) to differen-
tiate the risk attitudes of secondary users. Specifically, if
the expected utility E (ui(vi)) of secondary user i is larger
(or smaller) than the utility ui (E(vi)), then secondary user
i prefers not to or prefers to take the risk presented by
the uncertainty, and thus, secondary user i is risk-averse
(or risk-seeking). According to microeconomics such as
textbook [7], utility functions of the three types of risk atti-
tudes should follow the curves as illustrated conceptually
in Figure 2.




T Total transmission time of the frame
hi Channel coefficient of secondary user i
N The set of secondary users
bi The bidding strategy of secondary user i
bik The kth bidding strategy of secondary user i
Bi The set of bidding strategy of secondary user i
Ki The cardinality of Bi
ui The utility reward to secondary user i
vi The monetary efficiency function of secondary user i
Ci The channel capacity of secondary user i
ρi The transmit power of secondary user i
βi The risk preference parameter of secondary user i
bˆi The bidding strategy of winner i
θi The sensitive parameter of secondary user i
Ui The utility function of secondary user i
ωi The ordered auction price parameter of secondary user i
i∗ The index of the winning secondary users i
bidi The ordered (ith highest) bid of secondary user i
 The set of parameterized auction mechanisms
M The cardinality of 
ωm2 Themth element in 
r The utility function of base station
pik The probability of the kth bidding strategy of secondary user i
pi The probability distribution over Bi
qm The probability ofmth auction mechanism
q The probability distribution over 
gi The expected utility of secondary user i
r¯ The expected utility of the primary user
γ b(t) The reaction of the primary user
γ si∗ (t) The reaction of i
∗
λb The normalized parameter of the primary user
λs The normalized parameter of the secondary users
δb The stepsize of the primary user
δs The stepsize of the secondary users
di The distance from the primary user to secondary user i
Table 2 Characterization of heterogeneous secondary
users
βi Risk attitudes Types of secondary users
βi > 0 Risk-seeking High channel gain, real-time services,
urgent messages
βi < 0 Risk-averse Low channel gain, non-real-time services,
non-urgent messages
βi = 0 Risk-neutral Modest channel gain, non-urgent messages
Figure 2 Illustration of utility functions for risk-seeking,
risk-neutral, and risk-averse secondary users.
As mentioned above, heterogeneous secondary users
usually have different risk attitudes ui, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. In





eβivi − 1) , if βi = 0
vi, if βi = 0 (2)
vi (Ci, bi) = θiCi − bˆi, (3)
where βi is the risk attitude parameter of secondary user
i, bˆi is the price that the winning secondary user i should
pay to the primary user, and θi > 0 is the parameter con-
trolling the sensitivity of the channel quality for secondary
user i and keeping the term of Ci consistent with the unit
of bi.
As shown in Figure 2, when βi > 0, it can be seen that
the expected utility E (ui(vi)) of secondary user i is smaller
than its real utility ui (E(vi)), which means that secondary
user i tends to take the risk presented by the uncertainty;
so, it is risk-seeking. When βi < 0, the expected utility
E (ui(vi)) of secondary user i is smaller than its real util-
ity ui (E(vi)), which means that secondary user i tends not
to take the risk presented by the uncertainty; so, it is risk-
averse. When βi = 0, the expected utility E (ui(vi)) of
secondary user i is equal to its real utility ui (E(vi)), which
means that it is risk-neutral.
In practice, the value of βi depends on the type of sec-
ondary user i. In our work, as shown in Table 2, βi > 0
corresponds to a risk-seeking secondary user i who has
urgent message or real-time service and is rich, βi < 0
to a risk-averse secondary user i who has neither urgent
message nor real-time service and is poor of money, and
βi = 0 to a risk-neutral secondary user i who has no
urgent message and is of middle class.
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Moreover, we assume that if all secondary users choose
the same bid, no secondary users are allowed to access the
channel and the auction should be replayed. In such a sit-
uation, the utility of each secondary user and the revenue
of the primary user are equal to zero.
In summary, the utility function of the secondary users




0, otherwise , (4)
where ui is given in (2).
Note that this is a generic model of the heterogeneous
secondary users. All secondary users being of the same
type can be regarded as a special case of our proposed
model.
3.2 Auction mechanism design and utility function of
primary user
There are numerous kinds of auction mechanisms, such
as progressive auctions, Dutch or British auctions, sealed-
bid auctions, and discriminatory auctions. In our work, we
assume that the auction mechanisms are parameterized
into a finite discrete set.
Let’s take sealed-bid auction as an example. In a seal-
bid auction, a goods is put up for sale, and each potential
buyer submits a bid to the auctioneer; the auctioneer
chooses a winner and receives the payment from the win-
ning bidder. In most variants of sealed-bid auction, the
goods is awarded to the buyer who submits the highest
bid, and only the winner pays. There are two standard
sealed-bid auctions. In first-price auction, the winner’s
payment is its bid; in second-price auction, the winner’s
payment is the second highest bid. In this paper, instead of
relying on a particular auction, we parameterize a class of
auction mechanisms including both standard sealed-bid
auctions and non-standard ones.
In [4], a concept of vector-price auction is designed as
follows.
Definition 1. Let ω = (ω1, · · · ,ωnˆ) be a vector of nˆ
real numbers. A ω-price auction is a sealed-bid auction in
which the highest bidder, denoted as i∗, wins the goods






where n is the minimum between nˆ and the number of
bidders, and bid1, bid2, . . . are the bids ordered from the
highest to the lowest.
By using a special two-dimensional sub-space of ω-price
auctions, namely ω = (1 − ω2,ω2) with 0 ≤ ω2 ≤ 1, we
can already characterize a class of auction mechanisms.
In particular, ω2 = 0 corresponds to a standard first-
price auction, and ω2 = 1 corresponds to a standard
second-price auction; all other values of ω2 correspond to
non-standard auctions. In this paper, we assume that the
value of ω2 is chosen from a finite set . LetM be the car-
dinality of . Then, there areM mechanisms available for
the primary user to apply. Thus, the auctioneer can adjust
parameters in response to the results observed from the
previous auctions.
The primary user plays the role of an auctioneer, which
involves organizing the auction process and designing
an auction mechanism out of all different kinds of auc-
tion mechanisms that is able to achieve the maximum
expected utility. Denote  = {ω12, · · · ,ωm2 , · · · ,ωM2 },
where ωm2 is the mth element in . Then, whenever
ωm2 is given, the auction mechanism is actually specified.
In other words, ∀m ∈ {1, · · · ,M},ωm2 corresponds to(
1 − ωm2 ,ωm2
)
-price sealed-bid auction. Then, choosing an
auction mechanism becomes simply choosing ωm2 from.
With a specific auction mechanism, the primary user
receives the revenue from the payment of the winning
bidder. Moreover, to guarantee the efficiency of the sys-
tem, the capacity of the system should also be taken into
consideration. Let r denote the utility function (i.e., the









bid1 + ωm2 bid2, (7)
where i∗ denotes the secondary user whowins the auction.
For example, if the primary user designs (0.8, 0.2)-price
sealed-bid auction mechanism, the bid of the winner is
bid1, and the second highest bid is bid2; the utility func-
tion of the primary user is then given as 0.8 ∗ bid1 + 0.2 ∗
bid2.
3.3 Game theoretic formulation of auction-driven
dynamic spectrum access
3.3.1 Game theoretic setting
By viewing the channel as a goods in the resource market,
the primary user attempts to design the best mechanism
tomaximize its utility, while each secondary user attempts
to choose the best bidding strategy to win the auction and





and for the secondary users, we have
max
bi∈Bi
Ui, ∀i ∈ N . (9)
From a game theoretic point of view, the primary user
and the secondary users constitute the players; the auc-
tion mechanism and the bidding strategies constitute the
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pure strategies of the players. The utilities of the secondary
users and the utility of the primary user constitute the
payoffs of the players. Then, the interaction between the
primary user and the secondary users follows the frame-
work of a finite discrete game, which can be defined as
follows:
G =[ {N , primary user}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Player set
, {{Bi}i∈N ,}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pure-strategy set




3.3.2 Analysis of pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium
It is known from Nash [7] that every finite game in a
strategic form has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy.
Thus, our defined game G must have at least one Nash
equilibrium in a mixed strategy. Generally speaking, it is
difficult to ascertain how many Nash equilibriums G has
and whether the Nash equilibriums are in mixed strategy
or pure strategy. However, in some cases, we can ana-
lytically characterize the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium of G.
Theorem 1. If there is only one secondary user in the
network (i.e.,N = {1}),G possesses a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. From (2) and (3), it follows that if there is only
one secondary user in the network (i.e.,N = {1}), no mat-
ter what auction mechanism the primary user has applied,
the reserve price (i.e., b12) will give the secondary user a
larger payoff than any other bidding strategies. Therefore,
the reserve price is the dominant strategy of the secondary
user. Meanwhile, no matter what bidding strategy the sec-
ondary user is choosing, all auction mechanisms will give
the primary user the same revenue. Consequently, we have




, ∀b′1 ∈ B1, b1 = b12, ∀ω2,ω′2 ∈ 
(11)
and




, ∀b1, b′1 ∈ B1, b1 = b′1, ∀ω2,ω′2 ∈ .
(12)
According to the definition of pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium [7], we can draw the conclusion that a weak
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in G.
Furthermore, instead of employing an adaptive auction
mechanism design, the primary user always applies a fixed
auction mechanism; then, G reduces to Gˆ as below:
Gˆ = [N , {Bi}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N ] . (13)
In this case, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If Bi = Bj,∀i, j ∈ N , then Gˆ is an ordinarily
symmetric gamea. In addition, if Ki = Kj = 2,∀i, j ∈ N ,
then Gˆ possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If Bi = Bj,∀i, j ∈ N , then with the utility function
defined in (4) according to the definition of the ordinarily
symmetric games [20,21], for any permutation π ,
Ui (b1, · · · , bi, · · · , bn) and Uπ(i) (bπ(1), · · · , bπ(i), · · · , bπ(n))
must have the same ordinal rank of the payoffs.
Furthermore, from [21], it says that every two-strategy
symmetric game has a pure-strategy (not necessarily sym-
metric, though) Nash equilibrium. Hence, the theorem is
proved.
Since the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G does
not always exist in general, we should study the defined
game in a mixed strategy. In a mixed-strategy form of the
defined game G, the expectation utility function is used as
the metric of the satisfaction of each secondary user or the
primary user. In the following section, we will investigate
this issue by using learning automata.
4 Distributed learning automata algorithm for
evolving themixed-strategy game
4.1 Mixed-strategy game setting
In practice, the primary user usually has no prior infor-
mation of the secondary users and even has no knowledge
of how many secondary users are in a cognitive radio
network; therefore, it may incur a large amount of over-
heads for the primary user to obtain the perfect infor-
mation about all secondary users. Here, ‘perfect’ means
complete classes of the information, e.g., risk attitude,
valuations, and strategy spaces, and also means no infor-
mation should have error. Likewise, the secondary users
in practice are unable to have the perfect information,
and they even have no knowledge of the auction mecha-
nisms the primary user may apply. Thus, it is impractical
to employ a centralized decision making process to attain
the equilibrium of the game.
Based on the concept of learning automata, we propose
a distributed stochastic learning algorithm to adaptively
update the bidding strategies of the secondary users and
the auction mechanism of the primary user in a non-
cooperative manner. Stochastic learning technique has
been used for price dynamics [22], discrete power control
[23], multi-mode precoding strategy selection [24], and
so on. Our proposed distributed algorithm involves only
limited amount of feedback and is computationally simple
and efficient.
To construct the learning algorithm, we consider the
game G in its mixed-strategy form. pik denotes the
probability of secondary user i choosing bid bik , and∑Ki
k=1 pik = 1. Let pi =
(
pi1, · · · , pik , · · · , piKi
)
be the
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probability distribution over Bi. Furthermore, let q =
(q1, · · · , qm, · · · , qM) be the probability distribution over
, where qm denotes the probability of the primary user
designing the mth auction mechanism (i.e., ωm2 ), and∑M
m=1 qm = 1. pi and q are also referred to the mixed
strategies of the secondary users and the primary user,
respectively. Then, the expected utility gi for secondary
user i is given as follows:
gi (p1, · · · ,pi,q) = E [Ui | jth secondary user employs
strategy pj from Bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, primary user employs strategy

















j1, · · · , jn,ωm2
) = E [Ui | lth secondary user takes action




The expected revenue of the primary user is given as













4.2 Distributed learning automata algorithm for
mixed-strategy game
From the learning automata point of view, the secondary
users and the primary user are the automata; the bid-
ding strategies of the secondary users and the mechanism
design strategies of the primary user are the actions of the
automata. q(t) is the action probability distribution of the
primary user at instant t, and pi(t) is the action probability
distribution of the ith secondary user at instant t. Fur-
thermore, the normalized utilities of the secondary users
and the normalized revenue of the primary user are the
reactions of the automata.
Then, we can propose a distributed learning automata
(DLA) algorithm based on learning automata. In our pro-
posed DLA algorithm, the primary user learns probability
distribution q over the set of auction mechanisms (i.e.,
) so that it can maximize its expected revenue based
on imperfect information and the secondary users learn
probability distributions pi,∀i ∈ N over the set of bidding
strategies in order to maximize their own utilities.
We assume that the primary user acts after the sec-
ondary users at each updating round, and thus, it can
observe all the actions of the secondary users. That is,
first, the secondary users learn and update their bid-
ding strategies, and afterwards, the primary user learns
and updates its auction mechanism. Our proposed DLA
algorithm for the mixed-strategy game is elaborated in
Algorithm 1, and the corresponding flowchart is illus-
trated in Figure 3.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Learning Automata Algorithm (DLA).
Step 1 ∀i ∈ N , set the initial probability vector q(0) as: qm(0) = 1M , m = 1, · · · ,M, and pi(0) as:
pik(0) = 1Ki , k = 1, · · · ,Ki. Then, the primary user designs an auction mechanism ω2(0) according to the
probability vector qi(0) and each secondary user chooses a bidding strategy bi(0) according to its action
probability vector pi(0).
Step 2 At every instant t > 0, each secondary user chooses a bidding strategy bi(t) according to its action probability
vector pi(t) and then submits it to the primary user.
Step 3 If different secondary users have chosen the same largest bid, go to step 2; otherwise, the primary user judges the
winner of the auction. Then, the primary user computes the normalized revenue (i.e., its reaction) γ b(t) and
sends the index of the winner to all secondary users. After that, the primary user updates its action probability
vector q(t) through its updating rule in (17){
qm(t + 1) = qm(t) − δbγ bi (t)qm(t), ω2(t) = ωm2
qm(t + 1) = qm(t) + δbγ bi (t)(1 − qm(t)), ω2(t) = ωm2 ,
(17)
where 0 < δb < 1 is a stepsize parameter,m = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
Step 4 Each secondary user computes its reaction γ si (t) and updates its action probability based on the feedback from
the primary user through the updating rule in (18){
pik(t + 1) = pik(t) − δsγ si (t)pik(t), bi(t) = bik
pik(t + 1) = pik(t) + δsγ si (t)(1 − pik(t)), bi(t) = bik , (18)
where 0 < δs < 1 is a stepsize parameter, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, and k = 1, 2, · · · ,Ki∗ .
Step 5 If q(t) and all pi(t),∀i ∈ N converge, stop learning, and output the winner. Otherwise, go to step 2.
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Figure 3 Distributed learning automata algorithm for evolving the game in a mixed-strategy form.
In Algorithm 1, at instant t, γ si (t) is defined as γ si (t) =
λsUˆi(t), where Uˆi(t) = Ui(t) + φ, φ ≥ 0, and 0 <
λs < 1, such that the value of γ si (t) lies within the interval
[0, 1). Moreover, at instant t, γ bi (t) is defined as γ bi (t) =
λbrˆ(t), where rˆi(t) = ri(t) + φ, φ ≥ 0, 0 < λb < 1,
such that the value of γ bi (t) lies within the interval [0, 1).
Since secondary users usually have no prior knowledge
of their utilities, we employ a parameter self-adjusting
scheme which can be stated as follows. At instant t, if
∀i ∈ N , Uˆi(t) > 1λs , we set λs = 1Uˆi(t)+τ , where τ is a pos-
itive scalar; otherwise, λs remains unchanged. Similarly,
if rˆ(t) > 1
λb
, we set λb = 1r(t)+τ ; otherwise, λb remains
unchanged.
4.3 Convergence of the distributed learning automata
algorithm
The updating procedure of Algorithm 1 is known as a lin-
ear reward-inaction(LR−I) [13]. Its convergence can be set
out by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 converges to a Nash equilibrium
of G with sufficient small δb and δs for any initial points
in the mixed strategies except the initial points in the pure
strategies.
Proof. We first define a function on the mixed-strategy
set as follows:




f sik , i ∈ N , k ∈ K
f bk , i = primary user, k ∈ K,
(19)
where i ∈ {N , primary user},
K =
{
Bi, i ∈ N
, i = primary user (20)
f sik =E
[
Uˆi | jth secondary user employs strategy
pj, i, j ∈ N , j = i, secondary user i takes kth
















(21)f bk = E
[ˆ
r| lth secondary user employs strategy jl , l ∈ N ,









Then, from (14) and (21), we have
Ki∑
k=1
f sikpik = gi. (23)
From (16) and (22),it follows that
M∑
k=1
f bk qk = r¯. (24)




gi + r, (25)




and for i = primary user, k ∈ K,
∂F
∂qk
= fik . (27)
Then, according to theorem 3.3 in [13], the theorem is
proved.
From Theorem 3, it is known that the convergence of
the proposed algorithm is guaranteed. In addition, it is
known from [13] that when a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium exists, it will be a locally asymptotically stable point
of Algorithm 1.
5 Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed algorithm via computer simulations. Here, we set
B1 = · · · = Bn = B, and K1 = · · · = Kn = K . Further-
more, it is assumed that the channel gains of the secondary
users include path loss and fading effects. Mathematically,




where const is a constant, α is the path loss component,
h′i ∼ CN(0, 1), and di is the distance between secondary
user i and the primary user. {d1, d2, · · · , dn} are assumed





more, it is assumed that there are five secondary users in
the cognitive radio network unless otherwise stated. They
are randomly distributed over interval [20 m,15 0m], i.e.,
d = 20 m and d = 150 m. We set values as follows:
∀i, j ∈ N , Bi = Bj = {0, 1, 2, · · · , 13}, Ki = Kj = K = 14,
ρi = ρj = 0.01 Watts, const = 0.097, α = 4, W = 10 Hz,
σ 2 = 5 ∗ 10−14 Watts, θ1 = 1.5, θ2 = 0.7, θ3 = 0.8, θ4 =
1, θ5 = 1, β1 = −0.1,β2 = 0,β3 = 0.1,β4 = −0.1,
β5 = −0.3. The set of parameterized auction mechanism
of the primary user  = (0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1), M = 6,
δs = δb = 0.2, τ = 10, and φ = 300.
First, we plot the evolution of probabilities q for the pri-
mary user for a specific channel realization in Figure 4. For
illustration, we only plot the evolution of the choice proba-
bilities p of bidding strategies for some selected secondary
users, i.e., p13, p26, p39, p49, p510, in Figure 5 for a specific
channel realization. From these two graphs, we can see
that the proposed Algorithm 1 has good convergence,
and the probabilities of the auction mechanisms converge
faster. This is because the number of auction mechanisms
is much smaller than the total number of the bidding
strategies. And, we find that the proposed Algorithm 1
































Figure 4 Evolution of the probabilities of auction mechanisms
(q) for the primary user.
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Figure 5 Evolution of the probabilities of bidding strategies for
the selected secondary users.
converges to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in this
simulation. Furthermore, since we assume that the dura-
tion of the auction is fixed, we should control the runtime
of Algorithm 1 so that it will not be longer than the auc-
tion duration. In practice, the adaptive stepsize scheme
in [24] can be used to control the convergence speed of
Algorithm 1 and limit the runtime of Algorithm 1.
Then, we plot the average revenue
∑n
i=1 bˆi of the pri-
mary user in Figure 6, average sum utilities of the sec-
ondary users in Figure 7, and average sum capacities of
the secondary users in Figure 8 for 500 independent chan-
nel realizations. In these figures, RAM-RB denotes the
result where the primary user randomly chooses an auc-
tion mechanism and the secondary users randomly use
their bidding strategies.
It can be seen from Figures 6, 7, and 8 that our pro-
posed Algorithm 1 always achieves the highest perfor-



















































Figure 7 Comparison of the average sum utilities of the
secondary users.
primary user to receive higher average revenue (where
the maximum improvement is about 43%). Further-
more, Algorithm 1 also enables the secondary users to
achieve higher average sum utilities (where the maximum
improvement is about 300%) and sum capacities (where
the maximum improvement is about 32%) than the other
schemes.
Furthermore, we plot the average revenues of the pri-
mary users and the average sum rates of the secondary
users with different auction mechanisms in Figures 9 and
10, respectively, for a particular channel realization. The
parameters in Figures 9 and 10 are the same as those in
Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, except the following: β1 = 1,β2 =
0.5,β3 = 1,β4 = 1,β5 = 0, and θi = θj = 1,∀i, j ∈ N .
These two figures show that the proposed Algorithm 1
achieves higher average revenue than the other schemes,




































Figure 8 Comparison of the average sum capacities of the
secondary users.
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Figure 9 Comparison of the average revenues of the primary user with different auction mechanisms by using Algorithm 1.
Furthermore, we can see that the first-price mechanism
fails to result in the highest revenue.
These results mean that the first-price auction or the
second-price auction may not be optimal when the buyers
have different risk attitudes. The results also indicate that
our proposed algorithm can induce the secondary users to
choose higher bids and achieve higher average sum utility.
Note that in Figures 9 and 10, the term 1st-price denotes
the result where the primary user uses the traditional first-
price auction mechanism and the secondary users use our
proposed algorithm to choose their bidding strategies; the
term 2nd-price denotes the result where the primary user
uses the traditional second-price auction mechanism and
the secondary users use our proposed algorithm to choose
their bidding strategies. The term ω-price (e.g., 0.2-price)
denotes the result where the primary user uses the non-
standard ω-price (0.2-price) auction mechanism and the
secondary users use our proposed algorithm to choose
their bidding strategies.
Moreover, we plot the evolution of probabilities q for the
primary user and the secondary users in Figures 11 and 12
for n = 2 and in Figures 13 and 14 for n = 3 over a particu-
lar channel realization. Notice that Algorithm 1 converges
in all cases. However, in Figures 11 and 12, Algorithm 1
converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, while in
Figures 13 and 14, it converges to a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. The results in Figures 11, 12, 13 and 14 have
verified that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always
exists in our defined gamemodel, yet a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium may not.
At last, we plot the average revenues of the secondary
users with different types (i.e., different risk attitudes) in
Figure 15 for 500-channel realizations. The parameters are
set as below. Assume there are n = 4 secondary users
in the cognitive radio network. They are randomly dis-
tributed over interval [20m,150m], i.e., d = 20 m and
d = 150 m. We set the values as follows: ∀i, j ∈ N ,
Bi = Bj = {0, 0.5, 1, · · · , 6.5}, Ki = Kj = K = 14,






















Figure 10 Comparison of the average sum rates of the secondary users with different auction mechanisms by using Algorithm 1.
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Figure 11 Evolution of the probabilities of auction mechanisms (q) for the primary user when n = 2.

























Figure 12 Evolution of the probabilities of bidding strategies for selected secondary users when n = 2.
































Figure 13 Evolution of the probabilities of auction mechanisms (q) for the primary user when n = 3.
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Figure 14 Evolution of the probabilities of bidding strategies for selected secondary users when n = 3.
ρi = ρj = 0.05 Watts; const = 0.097, α = 4, W = 1 Hz,
σ 2 = 5 ∗ 10−14 Watts, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 1, θ3 = 1. The set
of parameterized auction mechanisms of the primary user
 = (0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1),M = 6, δs = δb = 0.2, τ = 10,
and φ = 100.
In Figure 15, risk-averse means that β1 = −1,β2 = −1,
β3 = −1,β4 = −1, risk-neutral means that β1 = 0,β2 =
0,β3 = 0,β4 = 0, risk-seeking means that β1 = 1,β2 = 1,
β3 = 1,β4 = 1, and the term ‘arbitrary’ means that
β1 = 0,β2 = −1,β3 = 0,β4 = 1. It is found that if the
secondary users are all risk-averse, then the revenue of the
primary users will be the lowest. If the secondary users
are all risk-neutral or risk-seeking, then the primary user
will receive higher revenue; the secondary users of ‘arbi-
trary types’ will result in modest revenue for the primary
user.



















Figure 15 Comparison of average revenue of the primary user
with different risk attitudes by using Algorithm 1. In 500
independent channel realizations).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have established a game theoretic frame-
work for auction-driven dynamical spectrum access in
cognitive radio networks with heterogeneous secondary
users. We have studied the Nash equilibrium of the
defined game and have proved that a unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists in some particular situations. Due
to the dynamic environment in cognitive radio networks,
neither the primary user nor the secondary users have full
information of the system. Thus, centralized algorithm is
impractical. To attain an equilibrium solution with only
incomplete information in a distributed setting, we have
proposed a distributed learning automata algorithm. We
have proved that our proposed algorithm can converge
to a Nash equilibrium of our defined game with proper
stepsize parameters. The simulation results have shown
that our proposed algorithm can enable the auctioneer
to obtain much higher revenue compared to the use of a
fixed auction mechanism. At the same time, the proposed
algorithm can significantly improve both the average sum
capacities and the average sum utilities of secondary users.
Endnote
aOrdinarily symmetric games are those that are
symmetric with respect to the ordinal structure of the
payoffs.
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